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society is the avoidance or mitigation of inflationary and deflationary trends.
Here lie all our hopes for full employment and our fears of the cost of living.
Attempts on the part of economists to control these fluctuations through
policies deduced from classical models of individual investment and consump-
tion decisions were conspicuously unsuccessful. To be useful, economics had to
devise systemic models from which emerged flexible instruments for compen-
sating aggregate streams of expenditures.
Economics is most useful when it avoids direct prescriptive contact with
individuals, applying its structural, systemic insights to individuals only
through impersonal alteration of the weights assigned to individual tastes and
plans. Such an approach is consonant with the doctrine of functional juris-
prudence, which is concerned not with states of mind, but with states of
affairs; not with fault or blame, but with effects. Without pretending to know
the structural or behavioral intricacies of antecedent conditions, we can let
"good" results live on and stamp out %ad" ones. If conceptual economics
cannot be translated directly into performatory terms for use in value-laden
economizing situations, it should ally itself with that style of jurisprudence
which declares bankrupt "any word that cannot pay up in the currency of
fact .... -4
Economists should not help legislators and judges evade moral obligations
by delegating decisions to abstract concepts and hidden forces. Instead they
should program the probable ramifications of adjustments of policy instru-
ments (e.g., taxes, public investment, unfair labor practices, minimum wages),
so as to help the majority decide how to alter an unwanted state of affairs.
To return at last to Shubik's book, his objectives are not altogether unlike
those endorsed here, but his confidence in the ultimate as well as the present
worth of his structural concepts, indices, and criteria seems both excessive
and premature.
DANIEL HALE GRAYj
THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW. By Harold J. Berman. Brooklyn:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1958. Pp. xviii, 662. $7.50.
Is there a place in the undergraduate curriculum for a course on the legal
process? If so, what should be its content? These, as I see it, are the central
questions raised by the publication of Professor Berman's pioneering text,
The Nature and Functions of Law.
This reviewer comments as a political scientist engaged in teaching public
law and government courses to undergraduate and graduate students in liberal
arts. But before the shattering cry goes up, "He's not a lawyer l" I might
note -for the record that I received a diploma from a well-known legal trade
school off Massachusetts Avenue in ,Cambridge, visited on the faculty of its
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sister institution fronting Wall Street in New Haven, and have been initiated
into the solemn company of the District of Columbia Bar. Thus, if I mis-
understand the noble purposes of both law and liberal arts, it is not from a
failure of exposure to either.
Courses dealing with law have been a standard item in the undergraduate
curriculum for many decades. Departments of Political Science usually offer
constitutional, administrative, and international law, and some teach juris-
prudence. Departments of History provide studies of the constitutional and
legal histories of particular countries or cultures. Anthropologists teach "Law
in Primitive Societies" and Philosophy Departments rarely omit a course in
some aspect of legal theory. Economics Departments and Schools of Industrial
Relations give labor law, while Business Schools feature assorted offerings on
contract law, law of business associations and the like. These are all courses
dealing with small-"'-law, or the law of something. What Professor Berman
wants taught is capital-"L"-Law, or, as law students quickly learn to intone
reverentially, "the Law"-the total mystery, from seamless web to "solemn
Ass."
A course of this kind, listed variously as "Law and Society," "The Legal
Process," or "The Growth of the Law," has appeared in a number of leading
universities in recent years. At times, as at Harvard and Yale, the course has
been taught by law professors. If I sense at least a part of their primary
motivations, these law professors mix a missionary zeal to spread the message
of the Law as Philosopher-King in the heathen clime of the college with a
bit of personal hunger for the broader intellectual atmospheres of the Arts
School, the opportunity it provides to speculate about problems of -philosophy,
politics, and history without having to sandwich these in, somewhat guiltily,
among the daily bread-and-butter sessions of the Law School. And, to put it
frankly, when it comes to probing the fundamentals of "the Law," law stu-
dents are not as lively and as adventurous a group to teach as the good under-
graduates. In other instances, the course on "the Law" has been given by
political scientists. My colleagues, I observe, often undertake this mission be-
cause they feel it grossly unfair that law faculties should have a monopoly on
the fun of playing Socrates, although it must be noted that the political sciea-
tists rarely know what it is to face the cup of hemlock that a crack law school
class can thrust forward in the midst of a daily dialogue on a fine point of
law.
Professor Berman, a member of the faculty of the Harvard Law School,
has taught courses on the Law at Harvard College and M.I.T., and has con-
ducted an experimental seminar in legal method for younger faculty members
in the social sciences. From this experience, he is convinced that "a basic
understanding of the nature and functions of law is by no means inaccessible
to the non-lawyer, and . . . can be of the greatest interest and value", to
college students. The trouble with existing Law courses, Berman states in his
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preface, is that the instructor must choose at present between bad texts or
his own set of readings.
Books written for laymen which attempt to present an overall picture of
the legal system are usually either too technical or not technical enough,
and in any case are not suitable as textbooks for a course. As a result
each instructor has tended to compile his own special selection of read-
ings. While this diversity of approach 'has certain advantages, there is
also a need for a common effort toward creating a common discipline,
through which the benefits of diverse experience may be shared.2
Berman's contribution toward a common curriculum is divided into four
sections. In Part One, "Law as a Process of Resolution of Disputes: Illus-
trations From Civil and Criminal Procedure," and Part Two, "Law as a
Process of Maintaining Historical Continuity and Doctrinal Consistency: Il-
lustrations From the Development of Doctrines of Manufacturer's Liability
in Tort," Berman has assembled a nice set of original essays, case materials
and edited articles. His technique of orienting the student into the subject is
concrete enough to hold their interest while speculative enough to fire their
minds. I particularly like the choice of the manufacturer's tort liability prob-
lem because it shows the concepts of common law growth, change, and search
for continuity. In Part Three, "Law as a Process of Facilitating and Protect-
ing Voluntary Arrangements: Illustrations From Judicial Remedies for Breach
of Contract," and Part Four, "Law as a Process of Resolving Acute Social
Conflict: Illustrations From Labor Law," Berman reproduces substantial
chunks from two distinguished casebooks written .by 'his colleagues Lon Fuller
and Archibald Cox,3 with some questions and notes interspersed by Berman
to fix the attention of the non-law-student on special points.
All of this is mounted, it is a sad duty to report, in the worst of the law
school book format. The Foundation Press, as though to -impart utter authen-
ticity, has employed the lack-lustre hornbook covering, dense typography, for-
malistic 'heading-type system, and sterile page format which has signified to
generations of law students that their adventures with graceful books were
over for three years. And, while there is no accounting for taste in humor as
in other matters, it is strange to find two dreadfully dreary cartoons thrown
into the first fifty pages, as if to show that law isn't really so stuffy, after
which a desert of type ensues for the next 600. At least political scientists
have had the inspiration to employ Herblock as their graphic colleague in
textbook ventures.
To turn to the questions raised by this book, first, is there a valid place in
the undergraduate curriculum for a course on "the Law"? I will not deal with
this issue in terms of academic nihilism, as by saying that there is as much
place as for the courses in basket weaving, driver education, social dancing, or
folk music which have elbowed their way into the curriculum of some of our
most distinguished universities. The question is whether such a course 'belongs
in a university which offers subjects appropriate to the liberal arts concept.
2. Ibid.
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At this level, two possible objections to a course in Law might be projected.
One is that such a course is too career-oriented. Berman's text is clearly not
vulnerable to that protest. The materials do not teach the law on any subject
in the professional sense, nor do they aim to rehabilitate lawyers from their
periodic lows in public esteem, nor to train students in the great American
legal game of Judge-Watching. The basic question Berman raises: What is a
system of law? If it is appropriate to say that a student leaves college incom-
pletely equipped if he lacks an awareness of what is involved in the problems
of science, history, literature, or politics, surely an ignorance of the process of
law is equally damaging. Yet most undergraduates have astoundingly ignorant
concepts about the legal process, and only a few will have this remedied by
law-school work. While I would not suggest that an undergraduate who failed
to take a course in a particular subject was doomed to eternal ignorance on
that matter, self-education in the process of law is harder, and less likely, for
the arts graduate than his obtaining a generalist's grounding in history or
economics or sociology, fields in which books for laymen are more frequently
and better written than in the field of law. In short, I see no validity in a
criticism of a course on Law such as Professor Berman's on the basis that it
represents a careerist intrusion into the liberal arts cloister.
Another possible objection is that the undergraduate is not prepared for
such a course. Sometimes this is urged on the ground of his tender years.
Sometimes, it is suggested in terms of the undergraduate's lack of mastery of
the rudiments of economics, history, government, and the like, which are
described as necessary prerequisites for a consideration of law. Neither argu-
ment is persuasive. Those law professors who teach undergraduates usually
come away pleasantly surprised at their capacity to handle legal materials,
when properly presented, and it is hard to see that a college senior, only one
year away from his entrance to law school (were he to choose that course)
is so incompletely endowed as to bar him from work in legal processes. More
important, the kinds of questions which flow from the Berman materials-the
transfer of social conflicts into courts, the reasoning method in law, the com-
parison of procedural systems in America with those on the Continent-com-
plement intellectual inquiries in main areas of the liberal arts curriculum and
are concerns worth the attention of an undergraduate seeking to understand
what society is and how it functions.
The second major question raised by the Berman book deals with course
content. My main reaction is not to disparage what Berman has placed in his
collection, which I find for the most part attractive, but to question what he
has omitted, which seems too much and too fundamental.
For example, no use is -made of available documentary materials to portray
a legal proceeding from its beginning t6 its end. The only thing in Berman's
book which comes near to this is the report of a demonstration of a pretrial
conference in federal court.4 Surely there was no need to rely on a mock trial
when tons of original records and transcripts beckon for skillful editing and
4. Pp. 134-49.
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presentation to the student. The late Judge Jerome Frank noted eloquently
that presentation of the documentary materials of legal proceedings and con-
flicts was absolutely essential for law students,6 and I think undergraduates
would profit from it as well. The idea of using transcript materials of a case
has already been experimented with in law school texts,0 utilized in moot
court programs at several law schools, and is the basis of a current text pri-
marily intended for liberal arts students, 7 and I think that Berman's is pre-
eminently the type of work which should include such materials.
Another shortcoming of the Berman collection is its overly impersonal pres-
entation of the nature and functions of law. This is not to say that students
receive a wholly mechanistic impression; there are, for example, two short
selections of comments 'by judges as to the external and internal processes of
their profession.8 But the Berman text falls quite short in making the student
aware of the men who shape the law as counselors, advocates, legislators,
judges, executives, and even law professors. One could think of a variety of
techniques to use here, from biographical selections and excerpts from reveal-
ing historical episodes to originally written descriptions by the editor of the
characteristics of the roles played -by the above men in making law. At any
rate, something more is needed, especially since the question of the personal
factor in the judicial process is a topic of great interest to the liberal arts
student in the contemporary climate of legal realism.
Finally, I think that it would have been useful to employ some hypothetical
cases to provide the basis for extended classroom discussion. The cases de-
vised -by Lon Fuller, such as his "Case of the Speluncean Explorers" and
the "Case of the Grudge Informer,"' 0 are so excellent for undergraduate use
-as this reviewer has fourid-that something like this would be a fine teach-
ing tool to include in future editions of the Berman volume.
A final word might be said about the undergraduate course on Law and
champions of it such as Professor Berman. Not the least justification for such
a venture would be the result that the most broad-minded of the law profes-
sors, men such as Mark deWolfe Howe, Jr., Charles L. Black, Jr., the late
Zachariah Chafee and Berman himself, who have taught arts courses on Law,
become involved in the arts arena, and thereby enrich the life of the colleges
and the hours of arts faculties by their presence.
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